




         
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
WORKING PAPER SERIES 
Individual Heterogeneity in Punishment and Reward  
♦
Andreas Leibbrandt and Raúl López-Pérez 
 
 
Working Paper 1/2011 
 
 
DEPARTAMENTO DE ANÁLISIS ECONÓMICO: 
TEORÍA ECONÓMICA E HISTORIA ECONÓMICA  
Individual Heterogeneity in Punishment and Reward
*
 
Andreas Leibbrandt and Raúl López-Pérez
†
 
February 1, 2011 
 
 
Abstract: We design experiments to study the extent to which individuals differ in their 
motivations behind costly punishment and rewarding. Our findings qualify existing evidence 
and suggest that the largest fraction of players is motivated by a mixture of both inequity-
aversion and reciprocity, while smaller fractions are primarily motivated by pure inequity-
aversion and pure reciprocity. These findings provide new insights into the literature on 
other-regarding preferences and may help to reconcile important phenomena reported in the 
experimental literature on punishment and reward. 
Keywords: Heterogeneity, inequity aversion; monetary punishment/reward; reciprocity; 
social norms. 
 
JEL Classification: C70, C91, D63, D74, Z13. 
                                                 
* We are grateful for useful comments and suggestions from Hubert Kiss, Antonio Martín-Arroyo, and 
participants at the IMEBE 2010 and THEEM conferences. In addition, María García-Sola provided helpful 
research assistance. We also gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and 
Innovation through the research project ECO2008-00510. 
† Leibbrandt: University of Chicago, Chicago, IL 60637, USA and Workshop in Political Theory and Policy 
Analysis, Indiana University, USA. E-mail: leibbrandt@uchicago.edu. López-Pérez: Department of Economic 
Analysis, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Cantoblanco, 28049 Madrid, Spain. E-mail address: 
raul.lopez@uam.es. 1. Introduction 
 
A large body of experimental data suggests that people have heterogeneous non-selfish 
preferences. For instance, laboratory studies show that subjects differ in their cooperativeness 
in social dilemma games (Ledyard, 1995; Fehr and Gächter, 2000), rejection behavior in 
ultimatum games (Güth, 1995; Roth, 1995), generosity in dictator games (Andreoni and 
Miller, 2002; Charness and Rabin, 2002), and effort provisions and wage offers in labor 
market games (Fehr et al, 1993). As these examples suggest, an accurate picture of 
heterogeneity in motivations may significantly improve our understanding of important 
phenomena. In addition, heterogeneity may help us to understand costly punishment and 
rewarding, behaviors which appear to be strongly coined by different non-selfish motivations 
(Blount, 1995; Offerman, 2002; Falk et al, 2003; Charness, 2004; Falk et al, 2005; Dawes et 
al., 2007; Falk et al, 2008; Nikiforakis, 2008; Johnson et al, 2009) and are crucial to explain 
cooperation and compliance with social norms (Fehr and Gächter, 2002).
1
  In this paper we present four simple games, use a within-subject experimental design, 
and apply a maximum-likelihood classification procedure to study whether and how 
individuals differ in their motivations behind costly punishment and rewarding. In these four 
games, a first mover chooses between two allocations of payoffs for her and a second mover. 
The second mover then observes this choice and decides whether and how strongly she wants 
to punish or reward the first mover. The within-subjects design and the different payoff 
constellations of the games make it possible to disentangle which motivation each second 
mover follows most likely. In this respect, we investigate five basic motivations to punish or 
reward which are prominent in the literature on non-selfish preferences: Inequity-aversion 
(Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), reciprocity (Rabin, 1993; 
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Cox et al., 2007), altruism (Andreoni and Miller, 2002), 
competitiveness (as suggested in Levine, 1998), and spitefulness (see also Levine, 1998). In 
addition, our design allows us to analyze more complex motivations such as combinations of 
some of these previous forces (for an example, see Falk and Fischbacher, 2006).
2
                                                 
1 Analog to other experimental papers, we define punishment in two-player games as a costly action that reduces 
the payoff of the co-player. Rewards are defined analogously.     
2 Although other papers have studied heterogeneity of non-selfish preferences before (e.g., Charness and Rabin, 
2002), this has been mainly done in the context of dictator games, which do not take into account reciprocity; or 
in public goods games, which do not permit to disentangle motivations like reciprocity and inequity aversion. 
Moreover, few papers have simultaneously studied punishment and reward (see Abbink et al., 2000, and Falk et 
al., 2008, for exceptions), which seems crucial to test the different models of social preferences. 
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a mixture of both reciprocity and equity concerns. More precisely, a second mover following 
this motivation punishes the first mover only if this player harmed her and has a larger payoff 
than her – the first pattern indicates reciprocal concerns, the second egalitarian concerns. 
Analogously, she rewards the first mover only if this player helped her and has a smaller 
payoff. In addition, there are considerable fractions of subjects who are purely inequity-
averse, purely reciprocal, or selfish, and smaller fractions of players who are predominantly 
altruistic, competitive, or spiteful. However, the analysis indicates that models with more than 
three types do not provide significant improvements for the interpretation of the observed 
behavioral patterns. Hence, our results do not only clarify whether heterogeneity is relevant, 
but also provide an idea about the extent to which heterogeneity should be accounted for.  
This paper contributes to the experimental and theoretical literature on non-selfish 
motivations, punishment, and rewards in at least four ways. First, we design experimental 
games which render it possible to discriminate between many prominent motivations for 
punishing and rewarding, including combinations of some of the basic models. This is 
important among other reasons because there seems to be little consensus in the literature with 
regard to the main force(s) behind costly punishment and reward. With respect to punishment, 
for instance, Falk et al. (2005, p. 2017) conclude that “retaliation […] seems to be the most 
important motive behind fairness-driven informal sanctions”, whereas Johnson et al. (2009, p. 
192; see also Dawes et al., 2007) suggest that “individuals who care about equality are those 
who are most willing to punish free-riders in public goods games”. Second, we show that a 
large fraction of individuals is motivated by a mixture of reciprocity and equity 
considerations, whereas relatively smaller fractions tend to behave as purely inequity-averse 
or reciprocal. As we explain in section four, these findings may be useful to reconcile earlier 
seemingly contradicting results in the experimental literature on punishment (Blount, 1995; 
Offerman, 2002; Falk et al, 2003; Charness, 2004; Falk et al, 2005; Dawes et al., 2007; Falk et 
al, 2008; Johnson et al, 2009), and possibly also on reward. Third, we provide evidence for 
the statistical significance of heterogeneity with the help of a rigorous classification analysis, 
encouraging the development of models which incorporate different motivations. Fourth, we 
use a punishment/rewarding technology which prevents potential confounds due to non-linear 
preferences when studying the determinants of punishment/reward.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the experimental 
design and procedures. Section three shows the predictions of the main theories in our games, 
reports our main results, and applies the classification procedure. Section four reviews related 
  3literature and suggests how our results may help to organize earlier experimental findings. 
The fifth section concludes. 
2. Experimental Design and Procedures 
  Participants in our experiment play four games, and all of these games are two-player 
games of perfect information and an identical two-stage structure. In the first stage, one player 
(called A) chooses between a left-hand and right-hand allocation of money between herself 
and another player (called B). Table 1 shows the two (A, B) payoff allocations available in 
each game (the different payoff constellations render it possible to discriminate between 
several models of non-selfish preferences; see section 3.1). Payoffs are presented in points; 
the exchange rate was 10 points = 1 Euro. 
TABLE 1―THE ALLOCATIONS IN THE 4 GAMES 
   Game 
   1 2 3 4 
Left  (250, 100)  (250, 100)  (100, 200)  (100, 200) 
Allocation 
Right  (200, 150)  (250, 250)  (150, 150)  (100, 300) 
In the second stage, B observes A’s choice and can then punish or reward A at a fixed 
cost of five points for B. More precisely, B can either decrease or increase A’s allocation by 
up to 100 points, but only if B decided to pay five points from her allocation share. If B does 
not want to affect A’s balance, no points are deducted from her allocation share. For example, 
suppose that A chooses allocation (xA, xB) in a game. If B decides not to pay the five points, 
allocation (xA, xB) is implemented. If she pays the five points, however, she can choose a 
score s [‐100, 100] so that A’s payoff in the game is x ∈ A + s, while B gets a payoff of xB -5. 
For simplicity, s had to be a multiple of 10. 
 We chose a punishment/reward technology with a fixed cost to facilitate the test of the 
theories and prevent possible confounds due to non-linear preferences. In effect, since 
additional units of punishment/reward have no additional costs in our design, any theory 
predicts that the players who punish/reward will do it with the same intensity independently 
of the curvature of their preferences. As an example, punishers/rewarders who are inequity-
averse should punish/reward with equal strength even if they are heterogeneous with respect 
to their marginal disutility from inequity. If additional units of punishment were costly, in 
contrast, players need not punish/reward equally strongly, and that would greatly complicate 
  4the theoretical analysis. In addition, this technology also prevents the existence of multiple 
equilibria in reciprocity models in our games.  
We conducted four paper-and-pencil sessions at University of (location), with a total 
of 92 participants. Participants were students from different disciplines (14 percent were 
economics students), and they were not students of the experimenters. Before each session 
started, we distributed instruction and decision sheets (dependent on role; see appendix I for 
the instructions of the B-players) in a class room, leaving enough space between seats to 
ensure anonymity. When the participants entered the room, they were informed that the 
decision sheets had been randomly distributed. The sheets were initially covered and the 
subjects could freely choose their seat; in that manner, we assigned them to be either an A- or 
a B-player. Subjects could read the instructions at their own pace and we answered their 
questions in private. We used neutral language and avoided terms such as “punishment”. 
Before proceeding with their decisions, participants had to fill out control questions to make 
sure that they understood the rules. 
Each subject played the games in the same role and with the same anonymous co-
player. Yet reputation effects were impossible, as no subject was informed about her 
counterpart’s actual choice in any game. This feature of our design also prevents changes of 
mood which may complicate the data analysis (i.e., the mood of a B-player could change 
depending on the A-player’s choice in a preceding game). Since players received no feedback, 
we employed the strategy method to elicit the decisions of the B-players, i.e., they indicated 
for both allocations in each of the four games whether they wanted to pay five points to affect 
their counterpart’s balance, and if this was the case, they had to decide which score s∈ [‐100, 
100] they wanted to assign to their co-player.
3
After subjects made their decisions in the four games, they answered a brief 
questionnaire. Then we collected their decision sheets and selected only one game randomly 
for payment in order to prevent possible income effects. This and all other features of the 
experiment were common knowledge to the subjects. Subjects were paid in private, and 
earned on average 18.3 Euros. Each session lasted approximately 60 minutes.  
                                                 
3 One additional advantage of the strategy method is that it maximizes the amount of statistical data gathered. In 
principle, the strategy method may induce different behaviors than the specific response method, where 
participants know the choice made by the other player. However, Falk et al. (2005) investigate this issue and find 
no differences in subjects’ punishment patterns, although the strength of punishment seems to be somewhat 
lower overall when using the strategy method. In addition, Brandts and Charness (2009) review the experimental 
studies that use both methods and find no treatment differences in most of them. Moreover, they find that 
differences are particularly unlikely in experiments in which players make numerous choices (as in ours). 
  53. Punishment and Rewards: Theory and Evidence 
This section studies whether and how individuals differ in their motivations behind 
costly punishment and rewarding. To organize our analysis, we first consider five prominent 
utility models that provide different rationales for costly punishment and reward, and derive 
their predictions for our games (3.1). We then briefly report some aggregate data across 
individuals (3.2) before analyzing behavior on the individual level and, with the help of a 
classification analysis, investigating the distribution of motivations across subjects (3.3). 
 
3.1 Theories 
We start by noting that selfish players never punish or reward in our games because 
these behaviors are costly and moreover reputation effects are ruled out by the fact that 
players are provided no feedback about the co-player’s choices. As a result, punishment and 
reward can only be explained by non-selfish motivations. We consider five utility models.  
The first two models predict unconditional behavior. To start, models of spitefulness 
(Kirchsteiger, 1994; Levine, 1998) assume that a player’s utility depends negatively on the 
co-player’s material payoff.
4 Formally, if ui and xi denote a player’s utility and material 
payoff, respectively, we have ui = xi + σ∙xj (i≠j; σ ≤ 0). In our games, a spiteful B should 
punish A maximally (i.e., 100 points) at all allocations if |σ| is larger than 0.05.
5 In contrast, 
theories of altruism (Andreoni and Miller, 2002; see also the model of quasi-maximin 
preferences in Charness and Rabin, 2002) assume σ ≥ 0 in the previous utility function and 
hence predict that an altruistic B should reward A maximally at all allocations if σ > 0.05. 
Any spiteful or altruistic player with |σ| < 0.05 will never pay the 5 points fee, thus behaving 
like a self-interested player. 
Consider now models of reciprocity. The pioneering model is Rabin (1993), which 
applies to any two-player, normal form game. Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) extend 
Rabin’s approach to a large class of n-player extensive form games; given the sequential 
nature of our games, we focus on this model here. Table 2 summarizes the predictions by this 
model in our games for a reciprocal enough player B (more precisely, for a B-player with a 
reciprocity parameter Y large enough; see Appendix II for a more detailed explanation of 
these predictions). The table also includes in parenthesis the precise score s predicted by the 
                                                 
4 Levine (1998) assumes the existence of other types of players. However, the empirical relevance of his model 
relies on the existence of a significant proportion of spiteful types. 
5 Such behavior increases the utility of a spiteful player in 100·|σ|, at a cost of 5 –i.e., the fee. Hence, it is optimal 
only if |σ| > 0.05.  
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Intuitively, B punishes if A harms her, that is, if A chooses the allocation (xA, xB) of the game 
with the smallest xB; while B rewards if A helps her, that is, if A chooses the allocation (xA, 
xB) of the game with the largest xB. In game 1 (250/100 vs. 200/150), for example, B punishes 
A if she chooses allocation (250/100), and rewards her if she chooses (200/150). Since the 
cost of punishment/reward is fixed, it follows also that a B-player who punishes/rewards will 
do it with the maximal strength (i.e., -/+ 100 points). 
TABLE 2―PREDICTIONS OF COSTLY PUNISHMENT/REWARD 
 
Allocation 
Game  Left 
 
Right 
Predictions Left  Predictions Right 
1  (250,100)  vs.  (200,150) 
C, IA, R 
(0, -100, -100) 
C, IA, R 
(≤ -60, -60, +100) 
2  (250,100)  vs.  (250,250) 
C, IA, R 
(0, -100, -100) 
C, IA, R 
(≤ -10, 0, +100) 
3  (100,200)  vs.  (150,150) 
C, IA, R 
(0, +90, +100) 
C, IA, R 
(≤ -10, 0,  -100) 
4  (100,200)  vs.  (100,300) 
C, IA, R 
(0, +90, -100) 
C, IA, R 
(0, +100, +100) 
The following notation is used: C = Competitive, IA = Inequity aversion, R = Reciprocity. In parenthesis, we depict the precise score s 
predicted by each theory at the corresponding allocation –e-g-, in the right-hand allocation of game 1, C predicts any score smaller or equal 
than -60, IA predicts punishment of -60, and reciprocity a reward of +100. The predictions of inequity-aversion and competitiveness take into 
account that subjects could choose only scores multiples of 10.  
Models of inequity-aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) 
assume that there are agents who dislike inequity of payoffs and are willing to spend money 
to reduce it. For instance, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) posit the following utility function in two-
player games: 
ui = xi – α∙max{xj ‐ xi , 0} – β∙ max{xi – xj , 0}, 
where α, β > 0 and α > β.  Table 2 indicates the predictions of this model in our games for 
large enough α’s and β’s (see Appendix II for a more detailed explanation). Intuitively, an 
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provided that α is sufficiently large. Since additional units of punishment are costless, B-
players punish so as to reduce inequity as much as possible, taking into account that only 
multiples of 10 were allowed when punishing and rewarding. In the left-hand allocation of 
game 1 (250/100 vs. 200/150), for example, B should reduce A’s payoff by 100 points if her 
α is larger than 0.1. Analogously, an inequity-averse B-player rewards A at any allocation in 
which A gets a lower payoff, provided that her β is large enough. The strength of the reward 
should be such that the payoff distance is maximally reduced. In the left-hand allocation of 
game 3 (100/200 vs. 150/150), for instance, B should increase A’s payoff by 90 points if her β 
is larger than 0.06. Note that a B-player will never punish or reward if both her α and β are 
zero or sufficiently close to zero. Since punishing/rewarding is so cheap in our design, 
however, it is worthy to stress that the values of α and β required for punishment/reward are 
very low. 
Other theories of inequity aversion make parallel predictions in our games. Bolton and 
Ockenfels (2000) assume that individuals dislike inequity with respect to their relative payoff 
-not the absolute one, as Fehr and Schmidt (1999) posit. However, this distinction is 
immaterial in two-player games. Finally, Falk and Fischbacher (2006) incorporate inequity 
aversion and reciprocal concerns in their model. Since punishment/reward is triggered when a 
player believes that she will get a smaller/larger payoff than her co-player, however, this 
model predicts the occurrence of punishment and reward in the same allocations as Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999), provided that beliefs and parameters are chosen conveniently. 
The last motivation we consider is competitiveness (as suggested in Levine, 1998). A 
competitive player never rewards, but she punishes the co-player if that allows her to become 
the player with the highest material payoff. In game 1 (250/100 vs. 200/150), for instance, a 
sufficiently competitive B-player should punish A if the latter chooses 200/150 (if B reduces 
A’s payoff in at least 60 points, B gets a larger payoff than A), but not if she chooses 250/100. 
While the amount of punishment should be at least enough to achieve an advantage, any 
additional amount is also predicted, as it has no cost. In allocation 200/150 of game 1, 
therefore, any amount of punishment equal or above 60 is consistent with competitiveness.  
Table 2 includes the predictions of the model in each allocation of our four games.  
Note that table 2 does not depict the predictions by altruism and spitefulness, as they 
are trivial (always reward maximally and always punish maximally, respectively). Finally, we 
make two remarks: (i) Our selection of games allows us to discriminate between any pair of 
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allocations; as we clarify later, this is crucial to study more complex motivations than the five 
cited above (e.g., a model predicting punishment/reward if it is predicted by both IA and R, as 
in the left-hand allocation of game 2, where both predict punishment). 
3.2 Experimental Results: Aggregate Overview 
Among the 368 decisions made by the B-subjects (8 decisions for each of the 46 B-
subjects), we find that 29.9 percent of them were to reward (s > 0), 27.7 percent to punish (s < 
0), and the remaining 42.4 percent were decisions to neither reward nor punish, i.e. not to pay 
the fee. Table 3 shows for each allocation of each game: (a) the percentage of B-subjects who 
spent the five point fee to punish, and (b) the average strength of the sanction among those 
players who punished. For instance, we observe that 45.7 percent of the B-players punish the 
co-player A if she chooses the left-hand allocation in game 1 (250/100 vs. 200/150); the 
average score assigned by these B-players in this case is s = -99.5.   
TABLE 3―OVERVIEW OF PUNISHMENT 
Game Allocation  Frequency  Average  strength 
   Left    Right Left  Right  Left  Right 
1  (250,100)   vs.   (200,150)   45.7  37  99.5  68.2 
2 (250,100)    vs.  (250,250)  56.5  17.4  93.5  77.5 
3 (100,200)    vs.  (150,150)  15.2  15.2  87.1  75.1 
4 (100,200)    vs.  (100,300)  28.3  6.5  80  80 
Table 4 presents the same data as Table 3 but with respect to rewards. Further, we note 
that the behavior of the A-players, which is not the focus of our study, is summarized in Table 
A in Appendix III. In addition, Table B in the same appendix displays the choices made by 
each B-subject in each game. 
TABLE 4―OVERVIEW OF REWARD 
Game Allocation  Frequency  Average  strength
   Left      Right  Left Right Left  Right 
1  (250,100)   vs.   (200,150)   13  28.3  83.3  81.5 
2 (250,100)    vs.  (250,250)  10.9  28.3  70  92.3 
3 (100,200)    vs.  (150,150)  52.2  15.2  90  95.7 
4 (100,200)    vs.  (100,300)  28.3  63  82.3  92.1 
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heterogeneous manners. For instance, while 8.7 percent of the B-subjects never punish or 
reward, we find some subjects who reward (6.5 percent) or punish (2.2 percent) in each 
allocation of the four games. Further, 15.2 percent never punish but sometimes reward, 23.9 
percent never reward but sometimes punish, and the remaining fraction of subjects (43.5 
percent) both punish and reward in at least one allocation. In the next section we focus on the 
individual data, and study heterogeneity in more detail. 
3.3 Individual Analysis of Punishment and Reward 
In this section, we analyze the behavior on the individual level and classify subjects 
according to the theory that best fits their behavior. We focus first on the occurrence of 
punishment and reward, leaving the analysis of their intensity for later – i.e., we study which 
theory predicts best the sign of the scores s (s > 0; s < 0; s = 0) chosen by each individual, not 
their specific values. Apart from greatly facilitating the exposition, there are several other 
reasons for this. To start, we can evaluate not only the theories cited in section 3.1, but also 
combinations and variations of these theories. Since these variations do not correspond to 
existing formal models, it seems wiser to study first if they can at least predict correctly the 
occurrence of punishment/reward. Further, we believe that studying which theory predicts 
best the sign of the scores chosen by an individual is worthy in itself, even if it is a less 
exigent task than predicting the point choices. In any way, we will see that theories that 
predict best the sign of the scores chosen by an individual (i.e., occurrence) also happen to 
predict with rather similar success the exact values of the scores (i.e., intensity).  
We start with two main findings: (a) For most subjects, there is no theory among those 
cited in section 3.1 that perfectly fits their actual behavior, and (b) if subjects are classified 
according to the theory that they follow most consistently, we find substantial heterogeneity. 
Figure 1 clarifies point (a) and illustrates the extent to which individuals consistently follow 
one of the six motivations mentioned in section 3.1. Considering for each player the theory 
that she follows most consistently, we categorize a player as “8/8” if she acts as predicted by 
that theory in all eight allocations, as “7/8” if she acts in seven out of the eight allocations as 
predicted by the theory, and so on. We can see that only 26.1 percent of the players behave in 
a manner perfectly consistent with one of the theories, i.e. they are categorized as 8/8. Indeed, 
most players follow their most consistent motivation in an imperfect manner (60.8 percent are 
classified as 5/8 and 6/8). For the majority of individuals, therefore, even the theory that best 
accounts for their behavior must allow for some error. 










Fig. 1: How consistently do players follow one motivation? 
 
The next pie graph (figure 2) illustrates which of the six motivations each individual 
most consistently follows. For example, if a player follows inequity-aversion with 5/8, and all 
other motivations with 4/8 she is included in the fraction of inequity-averse players.
6 The 
graph highlights two things. First, there are players for all six motivations. Second, there is no 
single motivation to which more than 31.5 percent are assigned (the maximum corresponding 
to inequity-aversion). Thus, this figure suggests that there is considerable individual 
























Fig. 2: Motivation of Players in Games
 
Since individuals apparently differ in the motivation and often do not follow this 
motivation in a perfectly consistent manner, we apply the procedure from El-Gamal and 
Grether (1995) to classify subjects into types and determine whether heterogeneity 
                                                 
6 If a player follows k motivations in an equally consistent manner (and the remaining motivations less 
consistently), we add 1/k players to each of the k motivations when computing their corresponding fractions. 
  11significantly improves our understanding of punishment and reward. For this, we first define a 
behavioral rule as a vector of strategies for player B, specifying one strategy for each of our 
games. As there are four games and player B has two information sets in each game, a 
behavioral rule is a vector of eight moves. The moves specify whether the B-player punishes 
or rewards (or does nothing) at the corresponding information set, without specifying the 
strength of punishment or reward. Thus defined, there are already 3
8 possible behavioral rules 
in our games; for brevity, we focus on rules based on the theories presented in section 3.1, 
that is, (1) selfish, which predicts no punishment or reward at any allocation; (2) altruism, 
which predicts rewards at all allocations; (3) spite, which predicts punishment at all 
allocations; (4) reciprocity; (5) inequity-aversion; and (6) competitive. The last three rules can 
be obtained from Table 2. In addition, we also consider some variants of these six rules, 
which we introduce later in this section and in Appendix IV. 
In the simplest scenario, we posit that all players punish and reward according to the 
same rule R, but also that they deviate from R at each allocation with probability ε > 0. This 
probability suggests how well rule R fits the data and can be estimated by maximum 
likelihood –simply by computing the percentage of actual choices that are unexplained by R.
7 
Proceeding in this manner for any rule, we can find the best single rule –i.e., that one with the 
minimal  ε. In a more complex version of the classification procedure, we can allow for 
individual heterogeneity by assuming that players follow different rules. For any combination 
of k rules (i.e. a model), we can classify subjects in types by assigning each subject to the rule 
that best fits her behavior, and given this assignment, we can compute the corresponding ε in 
an analogous manner as before. This estimated ε can be used to compare different models, 
find the model of two, three, etc. rules that best accounts for the behavior in our games, and 
thus provide an accurate picture of individual heterogeneity. Importantly, this procedure 
prevents the multicollinearity problems that could appear in a classical regression analysis if 
the rules were treated as independent variables and allows appropriate inferences even when 
testing all possible rules –no matter how similar their predictions are– at the same time. 
Table 5 indicates the best single rule and the best models with two, three and four 
rules, together with the percentage of subjects assigned to each rule in each model, and the 
estimated error rate.
8 We first stress the following: (1) The best single rule is inequity-
aversion, with an error rate of 49.1%; (2) the best model with two rules includes inequity-
                                                 
7 A more detailed explanation of the classification procedure is provided in --- (2009). 
8 Table 5 only reports error rates for the best models. In appendix IV, we discuss the error rates of some other 
models. 
  12aversion and selfishness; (3) with three rules, the best model includes altruism, inequity-
aversion, and selfishness; (4) the best model with four rules includes altruism, inequity-
aversion, selfishness, and spite; this model has an error rate of 0.258, which means that it can 
explain almost 75 percent of the choices of the average player. 
TABLE 5― RESULTS OF CLASSIFICATION PROCEDURE 
Number 
of rules  Best model 
Percentage of subjects  




1 Inequity-aversion.  100%  0.491   
2  Inequity-aversion; 
selfish.  63%, 37%  0.367 
> 200 
(<0.001) 
3  Inequity-aversion; 
selfish; altruism.  43.5%, 34.8%, 21.7%  0.298 
116,99 
(<0.001) 
4  Inequity-aversion; 
selfish; altruism; spite.  37.7%, 28.3%, 21.4%, 12,7% 0.258 
61.03 
(<0.1) 
The table shows that models with more rules have considerably lower error rates, 
providing further evidence that individuals are heterogeneous in the way they punish/reward.  
To infer whether heterogeneous models significantly improve the error rate, table 5 also 
presents the results from maximum-likelihood (ML) tests. Each of these tests indicates 
whether the net improvement obtained with the corresponding model is significant.
9 In this 
respect, we can see that a model with three rules explains significantly better our evidence 
than a model with two rules (which in turn explains better than a model with one rule). In 
contrast, a model with four rules only explains behavior marginally better (at the 10% level) 
than the model with three rules. In any case, our results clearly indicate that heterogeneous 
models significantly improve our understanding of punishment and reward.  
                                                 
9 To clarify this, note first that the optimal model with k rules is a restriction of the model with k+1 rules (if any), 
because the k original rules are also included in the model with k+1 rules (i.e., the models are “nested”). With 
this in mind, let λ = LR/LU denote the likelihood ratio, where LR and LU are respectively the values of the 
likelihood function for the restricted model and the more complex model. Since the statistic -2·Ln(λ) is 
asymptotically distributed as a chi-squared with degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions imposed 
(see Greene, 1991), we can reject the restricted model if we obtain very large values for -2·Ln(λ), as they 
indicate in turn very small values of λ. As a final clarification, observe that in a model with k rules we must 
determine for each subject the rule that he/she follows and those that he/she does not follow. This means k 
parameters for each subject (each one corresponding to one of the rules in the model); these parameters can take 
either value zero (the subject does not follow the corresponding rule) or 1 (the subject follows the rule). When 
we move from a model with k+1 rules to another model with k rules, we therefore impose n = 46 restrictions, as 
the parameters corresponding to one rule are restricted to take value zero for every subject.  
  13  Not finding the reciprocity rule selected in table 5, one may think that few individuals 
are motivated by reciprocity and that it is a relatively less important motivation than inequity-
aversion. For instance, figure 2 is implicitly based on a model with our main six rules (error 
rate = 0.215) and shows that reciprocal players, although they constitute the third biggest 
group, are also much less frequent than inequity-averse types. Further, the reciprocity rule has 
an error rate of 0.6 when considered alone, considerably higher than inequity-aversion (0.49). 
Yet some points suggest that reciprocity is as important as inequity-aversion. First, comparing 
the best model with two rules (i.e., inequity-aversion + selfish; ε = 36.7%) to other models 
with two rules, we note that (reciprocity + selfish; ε = 38%) is the model with the second 
lowest error rate.
10 Second, comparing the best model with three rules (i.e., altruism + 
inequity-aversion + selfish; ε = 29.8%) to alternative models with three rules, the model 
(inequity-aversion + reciprocity + selfish; ε = 31.5%) has the second lowest error rate. 
How can we reconcile this apparently conflicting evidence? One potential explanation 
is that a significant fraction of the players are motivated by both reciprocity and inequity-
aversion. These players might follow (with some error) the following behavioral rule (which 
we denote RIA, from reciprocity and inequity-aversion): (i) Reward the co-player if she has 
helped me and has a lower payoff than me, and (ii) punish if the co-player has harmed me and 
has a higher payoff than me. In other words, this rule predicts punishment/reward when both 
the inequity-aversion and the reciprocity rule predict punishment/reward (see table 2 for 
further clarification). 
The evidence from our games is in line with this explanation. Consider for instance 
figure 3, which is identical to figure 2 except that RIA is included.
11 We observe that RIA is 
assigned to 24.1 percent of the players, i.e. to considerably more than to any other rule. In 
addition, if we include the RIA rule in our classification analysis, we find that it predicts 
behavior better than any of our six basic rules. Considered in isolation, the RIA rule has the 
lowest error rate (0.476). It also appears in the best models with two rules (RIA + selfish; 
error rate = 0.38), three rules (RIA + selfish + competitive; ε = 0.296) and four rules (RIA + 
                                                 
10 Observe that the marginal improvement in the error rate when introducing the selfish rule is much higher for 
reciprocity (from 0.6 to 0.38) than for inequity-aversion (from 0.49 to 0.367). This suggests that inequity-
aversion alone explains better than reciprocity alone because the former shares more predictions with the selfish 
rule (inequity-aversion predicts no punishment/reward when the allocation is strictly egalitarian; this is not the 
case for reciprocity). As a result, inequity-aversion accounts better not only for the behavior of the inequity-
averse types, but also for the behavior of the selfish types. 
11 Table B in Appendix III indicates the type of each subject according to this analysis. 
  14selfish + altruism + spite; ε = 0.252).
12 Note also that the model with all seven rules illustrated 








Fig. 3: Types in Games (7 motivations)
 
If we compare figures 2 and 3, we find that the RIA rule takes the largest share from 
the inequity-aversion rule, which drops from 31.5 to 15.9 percent. The share of reciprocity in 
contrast is less affected (drops from 14.8 percent to 11.8 percent). Hence, the existence of the 
RIA types qualifies the importance of inequity-aversion. As further evidence for the RIA rule, 
we note that RIA can partially explain some of our prior contradictory findings like (i) the 
model (reciprocity + selfish) is almost as accurate as the model (inequity-aversion + selfish), 
and (ii) reciprocity does not appear among the more accurate models in table 5. More 
precisely, finding (ii) is probably due to two factors. First, reciprocity shares four out of eight 
predictions with inequity-aversion, and therefore it is relatively less complementary to 
inequity-aversion than other rules (altruism and spite share 3 out of 8, and competitiveness 1 
out of 8 predictions). Second, the classification procedure categorizes the RIA players as 
predominantly inequity-averse, and not as predominantly reciprocal.
13
In summary, our previous analysis and figure 3 suggest that the majority of the 
subjects are motivated by inequity-aversion and/or reciprocity, but in different manners. We 
can see these subjects as displayed along a segment, depending on the relative weight that 
                                                 
12 These models do not include the purely inequity-averse and reciprocal types, most probably because their 
behavior is more akin to the behavior of the RIA types than the behavior of the other types. As a result, the 
models improve their accuracy mostly by including the types most different to the RIA types. 
13 Observe from table 2 that the RIA rule shares more predictions in our games with the inequity-aversion rule 
than with reciprocity: In the right-hand allocations of games 2 and 3, RIA predicts neither punishment nor 
reward (as inequity-aversion), whereas reciprocity respectively predicts reward and punishment. As a result, our 
analysis in table 5 (which does not consider the RIA rule) classifies the RIA types as inequity-averse.  
  15they assign to inequity-aversion with respect to reciprocity. On the extremes of the segment, 
15.9 percent of the players can be classified as purely inequity averse, and 11.8 percent as 
purely reciprocal. In the midpoint, 24.1 percent of the players take into account both 
motivations, in the manner suggested by the RIA rule. 
We dedicate the remainder of this section to consider the intensity of punishment and 
rewards. In particular, we investigate if the best theory assigned to each individual predicts 
with comparable accuracy the occurrence of punishment/reward (i.e., the sign of the score s 
chosen at each allocation), and its strength or intensity (i.e., the specific value of s). If this is 
the case, our previous analysis in terms of occurrence also applies in terms of strength. We 
organize the analysis by considering each of the seven rules that appear in figure 3 (except the 
selfish rule, as this rule never predicts occurrence). First, among all subjects classified as 
purely inequity-averse, the theory predicts correctly the sign for 68 out of 88 choices. We 
observe that 46 of these 68 hits (67.6%) coincide exactly with the point prediction by 
inequity-aversion. If we do consider not only these choices, but also those which fall in a 10-
points interval around the corresponding prediction (e.g., this is a case of an actual choice s = 
90 when the prediction is s = 100; note that 10 points is the minimum error possible), we 
observe that 58 of the 68 hits (85.3%) happen to be in this class. Arguably, therefore, 
inequity-aversion does not only accurately predict the sign, but also the intensity of 
punishment and rewards among these players. Second, among all subjects classified as purely 
reciprocal, the theory predicts correctly the sign of 48 out of their 64 choices. Among these 48 
hits, 31 choices (64.6%) coincide exactly with the point prediction by reciprocity, and 34 
choices (70.8%) are within the 10-points interval. Third, altruism predicts correctly the sign of 
45 of the 56 choices of the subjects classified as altruists. Further, 86.7% percent of these hits 
coincide exactly with the point prediction, and 88.9% err by at most 10 points. Fourth, spite 
theory correctly forecasts the occurrence of 25 out of 32 of the choices of the subjects 
classified as spiteful, and 76% of those choices are equal to -100, that is, the corresponding 
point prediction (80% are in the 10-points interval). Fifth, both the occurrence and the 
strength of 26 out of the 32 choices (81.2%) made by the competitive subjects are correctly 
predicted by competitiveness.  
Finally, we consider the RIA rule. It happens that this rule correctly forecasts the sign 
of 104 of the 136 choices made by the RIA subjects. If we assume that the RIA rule makes the 
same point prediction as the reciprocity rule always when RIA predicts punishment/reward, 
we find that almost all hits (95.2%) coincide with the corresponding point prediction (99% 
happen to be in the 10-points interval). 
  16In summary, our analysis shows that the theory or type assigned to each subject does 
not only predict rather successfully the sign of her choices, but also its exact value or strength. 
It follows that heterogeneity is not only important to understand the occurrence of 
punishment/reward, but also its intensity.  
4. Reconciling the Experimental Literature on Punishment 
In this section we argue that the conjecture that approximately half of the individuals 
are either purely inequity-averse, purely reciprocal, or RIA may reconcile some of the 
contradicting evidence in the experimental literature on costly punishment. We formulate 
testable predictions based on this conjecture and test for their validity by reviewing other 
experimental findings on punishment. This exercise is not only interesting because it could 
help to organize important results in the existing experimental literature, but also because it 
suggests that our results are robust and can be extended to other games and studies.  
 
Predictions for Punishment: We predict that punishment towards a co-player in one-shot 
games should be (a) most pronounced in a situation in which the co-player is richer and has 
harmed the punisher. In effect, in this case the RIA, purely reciprocal, and purely inequity-
averse players should punish (provided of course that the cost of punishment is sufficiently 
low). In comparison, punishment occurs less frequently towards (b1) a richer co-player who 
has not harmed the punisher (only purely inequity-averse players punish), and (b2) a co-
player who has harmed the punisher but is not richer (only purely reciprocal players punish). 
Finally, (c) little punishment occurs if there was no harm and the person who can be punished 
is not richer (only the smaller fractions of spiteful and competitive players may punish). 
 
Evidence: Prediction (a) is consistent with punishment behavior in public goods games with a 
punishment stage as most punishment comes from the contributors and is targeted towards the 
non-contributors who as a result of their harming behavior are richer than the contributors 
(Ostrom et al. 1992; Fehr and Gächter, 2000). Falk et al. (2005) find similar patterns of 
punishment in social dilemma games even if the punishment technology is such that one 
player alone cannot reduce inequity with another player by sanctioning her (because it costs 
one unit to reduce the co-player’s payoff in one unit; see also Sefton et al., 2007). Although 
  17the inequity-averse types should not punish in this case, this evidence is compatible with our 
conjecture on heterogeneity, as some RIA and purely reciprocal players might punish.
14  
  In turn, prediction (b1) is consistent with the evidence from Falk et al. (2003; see also 
Brandts and Solá, 2001), who study several mini-ultimatum games and show that the rejection 
rate of the (proposer, responder) offer (8, 2) depends on the alternative offer. While rejection 
rates are significantly lower if choice (8, 2) does not harm the responder (i.e., the responder’s 
payoff at the alternative offer is lower or equal than 2), there is some rejection of offer (8, 2) 
even in these cases. The existence of the inequity-averse types can also explain why some 
players punish a richer co-player even if she is passive and hence could make no harm (Zizzo, 
2003; Dawes et al. 2007, Johnson et al., 2009; reference, 2009), or why unaffected “third 
parties” in reference (2009) direct their sanctions mostly towards richer co-players – see Fehr 
and Fischbacher (2004) as well. 
   Furthermore, prediction (b1) is in line with several papers that report an effect of 
intentionality on punishing behavior (Blount, 1995; Offerman, 2002; Falk et al, 2008). In the 
context of the ultimatum game, for instance, Blount (1995) finds that subjects are significantly 
less likely to reject an offer if it is randomly selected by a computer than if it is intentionally 
chosen by the co-player, but also that some rejections occurred even when the computer 
determined the offer. This pattern is consistent with our prediction as inequity-averse types 
punish in both cases whereas RIA and reciprocal types should punish only other players who 
intentionally harmed them. To finish, we note that prediction (c) is also in line with several 
papers. For instance, the previously cited study by Falk et al (2005) consider one treatment in 
which punishment is relatively cheap, and report that only 13 percent of the non-cooperators 
reduced the payoff of the (poorer) cooperators (see also Fehr and Gächter, 2000).  
  Finally, we note that similar predictions with respect to rewards can be tested using 
experiments. We predict that the frequency of reward towards an active co-player in one-shot 
games should be (a) most pronounced in a situation in which the co-player is poorer and 
moreover helped the punisher (RIA, purely reciprocal and purely inequity-averse players 
reward, provided that the cost of reward is sufficiently low). In comparison, (b1) reward 
occurs less frequently towards a poorer co-player who has not helped the punisher (only 
purely inequity-averse players reward), and (b2) towards a co-player who has helped the 
punisher but is richer (only purely reciprocal players reward). Finally, (c) little reward occurs 
                                                 
14 Yet note that punishment should occur less frequently as its price increases, as the evidence from Anderson 
and Putterman (2006) and Carpenter (2007) indicates. Hence, it seems plausible that the most price-sensitive 
RIA and reciprocal types should not punish if the effectiveness of punishment is 1:1 as in Falk et al. (2005).  
  18if there was no help and the person who can be rewarded is richer (only the small fraction of 
altruistic players may reward).  
5. Conclusion 
Our findings indicate that models with multiple types significantly improve the 
understanding of costly punishment and rewards. We find that not only both inequity-aversion 
and reciprocity should be taken into account, but also the intersection between the two: Some 
subjects seem primarily motivated by inequity-aversion, others primarily by reciprocity, and a 
large fraction by a combination of both motivations. In addition, we also find fractions of 
altruistic, competitive, selfish, and spiteful players. We hope that these findings may help to 
further develop recent models of social preferences and reconcile seemingly contradicting 
findings in the related experimental literature.  
We end with ideas for further experimental research. To start, one could change some 
parameters in our experimental design to study different issues. For instance, one can vary the 
price of punishment/reward and investigate how this affects the different player types (e.g., 
are inequity-averse types as sensitive to the price as reciprocal types?). It may be also 
interesting to introduce communication between players and study how this affects the 
behavior of the different types. For instance, some types of B-players may use communication 
to approve or disapprove the A-player for her choice, and abstain in that case from punishing 
or rewarding in a monetary manner (see Xiao and Houser, 2005). Other types, however, may 
not regard communication as a substitute for monetary punishment and hence continue 
punishing. 
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  22Appendix I: Instructions for the B-players. 
 
General Instructions for Participant B 
 
 
Welcome to this experiment on decision making. At the end of the experiment, you 
will be paid some money; the precise amount will depend on your decisions and the decisions 
of another participant. During the experiment we always speak of points; note that 
10 points = 1 Euro 
Please, do not talk to any other participant during the experiment. If you do not follow 
this rule we will have to exclude you from the experiment and you will not earn any money. If 
you have questions, please raise your hand and we will attend you. 
There are two types of participants in this experiment: A and B. There is the same 
number of participants of each type. Previously, the instructor has distributed in a random 
manner the same number of instructions for each type across the room. Given your seat 
choice, you are a type B participant. Further, you will be anonymously matched with a 
type A participant (in what follows, we call him/her A). You will never know the type of 
any other participant, nor will any other participant get to know your type. The decisions in 
this experiment are anonymous. This means no participant will ever know which participant 
made which choice. 
Description of the Experiment 
 
  
You, as player B, and A will take decisions in four scenarios, all of them with a two-
stage structure. In the first stage of each scenario, A has to decide between two allocations of 
points for A and you. In the hypothetical example of the figure, the left-hand allocation gives 
150 points to A and 150 points to you. The right-hand allocation gives 390 points to A and 60 









B: 150 In the second stage of each scenario, you can affect the balance of A. For this, you 
must pay previously 5 points. If you pay the 5 points, you can then assign to A any amount of 
points between -100 and +100. This amount will decrease or increase the balance of A by the 
same amount. If you choose not to pay the 5 points, you cannot assign any points to A so that 
the allocation chosen by A is implemented. 
 
Example 1: Suppose that A chooses the left-hand allocation in the previously 
illustrated scenario and that you decide then to spend the 5 points and assign +60 points to A. 
Then A would have a balance of 150 + 60 = 210, and you would get 150 – 5 = 145 points.  
Example 2: Suppose that A chooses the right-hand allocation in the previously 
illustrated scenario and that you decide then to spend the 5 points and assign -30 points to A. 
Then A would have a balance of 390-30 = 360, and you would have 60-5 = 55 points. 
 
Important: When deciding, you will not know the allocation actually chosen by A in 
any scenario. For this reason, you will indicate your decision for any possible choice by A at 
any scenario. Following with the example of the figure, you should answer four questions: (1) 
Would you pay the 5 points if A had chosen (150, 150)?, (2) in case you pay the 5 points, 
what amount of points (between -100 and +100) would you assign then to A?, (3) and (4) the 
same questions if A had chosen (390, 60). 
After all participants have taken their decisions in the four scenarios and answered a 
brief questionnaire, the instructor will collect your form. Afterwards, one scenario will be 
chosen randomly (with the roll of a die). This is important because any participant will be 
paid only for her/his final point score in that scenario (the instructor will divide that score by 
10). To finish, note that you will be paid in private and that we will inform you in that 







  2Before we proceed with the experiment, please answer the following control questions. 
Raise your hand after that so that we can verify that the answers are correct. 
In the hypothetical example of the figure, assume the following: (a) B decides to pay 
the 5 points if A had chosen allocation (A: 150, B: 150), and assigns then +100 points to A, 








B: 150   
 
Taking into account all this, answer the following questions,  
•  What would be the final point score of A if she/he chooses (A: 150, B: 150)? _______ 
•  What would be the final point score of B if A chooses (A: 150, B: 150)? ___________ 
•  What would be the final point score of A if she/he chooses (A: 390, B: 60)? ________ 
•  What would be the final point score of B if A chooses (A: 390, B: 60)? ____________ 
In addition: 
•  Will you know any of the decisions taken by A before you have made your decision in 
all four scenarios?  Yes          No 
•  Will A know any of your decisions before she/he has made her/his decision in all four 
scenarios?  Yes          No 
•  How many scenarios has this experiment? __________ How many scenarios will be 
relevant for your payment? __________ 





  3Appendix II: Concise explanation of the models’ predictions in our games  
We first sum up the basic concepts and hypothesis behind the model of reciprocity by 
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) –many of these ideas also apply for the model by Rabin 
(1993). Given player A’s expectations about the distribution of monetary payoffs to be 
reached in one game, let (xAe, xBe) denote B’s beliefs about A’s expectations –i.e., B’s second-
order beliefs. From B’s point of view, A’s intentions are kind (unkind) to B if xBe is larger 
(smaller) than B’s “equitable” payoff -i.e., the average of the maximum and minimum of B’s 
payoffs within the set of allocations that B deems attainable by means of Pareto-efficient 
strategies. Given this, a player’s utility function consists of the sum of her monetary payoff 
and a reciprocity component. In this respect, it suffices to note that B’s reciprocity component 
takes positive values if she punishes (rewards) A whenever she believes that A’s intentions 
are unkind (kind) to her.  
  To derive precise predictions in any of our games, observe first that B will always 
believe that A’s intentions are unkind (kind) if A chooses the allocation (xA, xB) of the game 
with the smallest (largest) xB –i.e., if A harms (helps) B. In effect, since the 
punishment/reward technology is such that B must pay only 5 points to punish or reward, B 
gets always less (more) than the “equitable” payoff if A harms (helps) her, no matter whether 
B uses the technology afterwards. If player B is sufficiently reciprocal, therefore, she should 
punish A in case she harms B, and otherwise reward her. More precisely, players in 
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) can be heterogeneous, as a parameter Y measures the 
sensitivity to reciprocity concerns. Then one can show that any reciprocal player with Y larger 
than 0.003 should punish and reward in the manner cited.
1 Since the cost of 
punishment/reward is fixed, moreover, it follows that a B-player who finds it optimal to 
punish/reward will do it with the maximal strength (i.e., -/+ 100 points). 
With respect to the model of inequity-aversion by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), recall 
that it posits the following utility function in two-player games: 
ui = xi – α∙max{xj ‐ xi , 0} – β∙ max{xi – xj , 0}, 
where α, β > 0, 1 > β, and α > β.  In our games, an inequity-averse B-player should punish A 
at any allocation in which A gets a higher payoff, provided that α is large enough. Since 
                                                 
1 A proof of this result can be requested from the authors. A reciprocal player with Y < 0.003 should exhibit a 
different pattern of reward and punishment. For instance, she should never punish or reward if Y is sufficiently 
close to zero. If Y is sufficiently close but smaller than 0.003, she should punish (reward) only if the size of harm 
(help) is high. Our analysis indicates that this kind of behavior is non-relevant.  
  4additional units of punishment are costless in our design, B-players should punish so as to 
reduce the payoff distance as much as possible –for this, remember that subjects in our 
experiment were restricted for simplicity to choose levels of punishment/reward which are 
multiples of 10. In the right-hand allocation of game 1 (250/100 vs. 200/150), therefore, B 
should reduce A’s payoff by 60 points if her α is larger than α > 0.1·(1 + β). This behavior 
leads to the distribution 140/145, which is optimal because 145 - β∙(145 – 140) > 150 – α∙(200 
– 150) for any α > 0.1·(1 + β).
2 The argument is similar in the other allocations in which 
punishment is predicted, and even smaller values of α predict punishment there (any α > 0.1). 
Note in any case that, since β is smaller than 1 by assumption, expression 0.1·(1 + β) can 
never be larger than 0.2. 
  With respect to rewards, an inequity-averse B-player should reward A at any 
allocation in which A gets a lower payoff, provided that her β is large enough. Further, the 
reward should be maximal or almost maximal (90 points). This latter behavior is for instance 
optimal in the left-hand allocation of game 3 (100/200 vs. 150/150), as it leads to the 
allocation 190/195, which is optimal because 195 - β∙(195 – 190) > 200 - β·(200-100) if β > 
0.06. Observe that a reward of 90 is better in this allocation than one of 100, which creates a 
disadvantage for the B-player. Note finally that a B-player will never punish or reward if both 







                                                 
2 Note that a punishment of 60 is better than a punishment of 50 because, although both achieve the same 
distance in payoffs in this allocation, the former punishment creates advantageous inequity, which is more liked 
than the disadvantageous inequity created by the punishment of 50. 
3 A player whose α is smaller but sufficiently close to 0.1, in contrast, will punish when the disadvantageous 
payoff distance is larger or equal than 100 –as in the left-hand allocation of game 1 (250/100 vs. 200/150)-, but 
not otherwise. Something analogous occurs with the rewarding behavior if β is smaller but sufficiently close to 
0.06. While the existence of this kind of behavior could be analyzed with the help of our classification 
procedure, we have chosen not to do that in detail for two reasons: (a) The values of α and β that make this 
behavior possible seem rather marginal; e.g. the distribution of types suggested by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) 
never considers such low values for α and β, and (b) when we apply the classification analysis to explore a 
similar behavior (see Appendix IV), we achieve no substantial improvement in the understanding of the data.  
  5Appendix III: Aggregated choices of the A-players and individual choices 
by the B-players. 
TABLE A―A-players’ Behavior 
          
Game Allocation  Frequency 
   Left    Right  Left  Right 
1  (250,100)   vs.   (200,150)   60.9%  39.1% 
2 (250,100)    vs.  (250,250)  10.9%  89.1% 
3 (100,200)    vs.  (150,150)  30.4%  69.6% 
4 (100,200)    vs.  (100,300)  26.1%  73.9% 
 
 
TABLE B―B-players’ choices and types 
subject  Type  Scores (s) chosen at each allocation by the corresponding subject 
    1L 1R 2L 2R 3L 3R 4L 4R 
1  IA/RIA/SE -100 -50 -100  0  0  0  0  0 
2  RE  -100 100 -100 100 100 100 -100 100 
3 SE/CO  0  -60  0  100  0 0 0  100 
4  RIA  -100 0 -100 0  0  0 -100  100 
5  RIA  -100 0 -100 0  0  0  0 100 
6  SE  0  -50  0 0  40  0 0 0 
7  CO  0 -60 0 -20 0 -20 0  0 
8  RIA  -100 0 -100 0  -90  0 -100  100 
9  RIA  -100 0 -100 0 100 0 -100  100 
10  SE  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11 RE  0  50  -100  100  100  70  -40  100 
12  CO  -100 -100 -100 -100  0  -100  0  0 
13  RIA  -100 0 -100 0 100 0  0 100 
14 IA/RIA  0  0 -90 0 90 0 80  70 
15  RE/AL/RIA/SE 0 100 0 100  100 0  0 100 
16  SP  0 -70 0 -50  -40 0 -40  -40 
17  CO  0 -100 0 -100  -100  -100 0  0 
18  RIA/SE 0 0 0  100  100  0 0  100 
19  SP  0 -100 0 -100  -100 0 -100  -100 
20  AL  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
21  SE  0  -100  0 0 0 0 0 0 
22  IA/RE/RIA  -90 40  -100 0 100 0 -100  100 
23  RIA/SE -100 0 -100 0  0  0  0  0 
24  IA  -100 -50 -100  0  100  0  100 100 
25 IA/RE/RIA -100 50 -100  0  90  0  -30 100 
26  IA/RIA  -100 0 -100 0 100 0 100  100 
  627 AL  80  100  -50  100  100  0  90  100 
28  SP  -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 
29  SP  -100  -90  -100 -100 -100 -100 -100  0 
30  RE/RIA  -100 100 -100 100 100  0  0  100 
31 RE  60  80  -30  80  -80  0  -50  10 
32  IA  -100 -60 -100  0  90  0  90  100 
33  RIA  -100 0 -100 0  0  0  0 100 
34  AL  0 100 0 100  100  100  100  100 
35  SE  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
36  IA  0 -40 0 -50  20 0 20 60 
37  IA  0 -50  -60 0 90 0 90 0 
38  SE  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
39  AL  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
40  AL  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
41  IA  0 -30  20 0 50 0 20  50 
42  RE  -100 40 -100 20  90  -50 -80 100 
43  RIA  -100 0 -100 0 100  -60  0 100 
44  SE  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
45  AL  60 0 30 0  0  100  80  80 
46 IA/RIA/SE -100 -50 -100  0  0  0  0  0 
Note: 1L denotes the left-hand allocation in game 1, 2R denotes the right-hand allocation in game 2, 
and so on. For the types, the following notation is used: AL = Altruistic, C = Competitive, IA = 
Inequity averse, R = Reciprocal, SE = Selfish, SP = Spiteful. RIA refers to the RIA rule. 
 
  7Appendix IV: Additional results from the classification analysis 
 
Table 5 only reports error rates for the best models, but is silent for the others. Here 
we discuss the error rates of other models. In this manner, we can study the relative 
performance of each of these models. 
Altruism & Spite: If we posit that all subjects follow the altruism rule, the error rate equals 
0.70. Theories of altruism, however, allow for some parametric heterogeneity (see section 
3.1), which implies that subjects with a large σ follow the altruism rule while others follow 
the selfish rule. This model with two rules (altruism + selfish) has an error rate of 0.42. In 
turn, the spite rule has an error rate of 0.72 while the model (selfish + spite) has one of 0.48. 
Competitiveness: Under the assumption that all subjects follow the competitive rule, the error 
rate is equal to 0.69. If we introduce some parametric heterogeneity, a model with two rules 
(competitive + selfish) has an error rate of 0.52. 
Inequity-aversion: As indicated in table 5, the error rate of the inequity-aversion rule is 0.49. 
Note however that theories of inequity aversion like Fehr and Schmidt (1999) assume some 
parametric heterogeneity so that players with α > 0.1·(1 + β) and β > 0.06 (see Appendix II) 
should follow the inequity-averse rule, while players with α and β sufficiently close to zero 
should follow the selfish rule. In this respect, the model of two rules (inequity-aversion + 
selfish) has an error rate of approximately 0.37, as also reported in table 5. We can allow for 
further parametric heterogeneity by introducing an additional “envy” rule predicting 
punishment as the inequity-aversion rule, but no reward (this corresponds for instance to the 
case β = 0 but α > 0.1·(1 + β); see footnote 3 in Appendix II in this respect). It follows that 
models like (envy + selfish), (envy + inequity-aversion), and (envy + inequity-aversion + 
selfish) have error rates of 0.46, 0.39, 0.33 respectively. By adding this envy rule, therefore, 
we do not lower the error rate in comparison to the best models with two or three rules. 
  We finally note that, for brevity, we do not report all the results from our classification 
analysis here. For instance, we have also considered variations of the RIA rule, like a 
reciprocity-equity rule which coincides with the reciprocity rule except that it predicts no 
punishment at those allocations with strictly equal payoffs. These slight variations from the 
RIA also perform rather well, which is again evidence in favor of the idea that some people 
take into account both equity and reciprocal considerations when punishing/rewarding. 
  8